Priority Paradoxes in Patent Law by Stern, Richard H.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 16 
Issue 1 Issue 1 - December 1962 Article 6 
12-1962 
Priority Paradoxes in Patent Law 
Richard H. Stern 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard H. Stern, Priority Paradoxes in Patent Law, 16 Vanderbilt Law Review 131 (1962) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol16/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Priority Paradoxes in Patent Law
Richard H. Stern*
The author here outlines the law governing the Patent Office inter-
ference proceeding for determination of the relative priority of claim-
ants. He uses an axiomatic system to examine and illustrate the present
statute and through the use of this system points out a paradox which
under the existing laws allows an undesirable circularity of priorities
among parties. Mr. Stern then proposes a statutory amendment elimi-
nating this paradox.
The constitutional provision governing patents gives Congress the
power to promote the progress of useful arts "by securing for limited
Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries."'
Because an "exclusive right" suggests an exclusive grant, the Patent
Office interference proceeding has been created2 for the purpose of
determining administratively the question of priority of rights between
two or more parties claiming substantially the same invention.3 This
article attempts to state in terms of an informal axiomatic system the
rules of law for determining priority of invention, and then examine
that system to explore its possible paradoxes Finally, an amendment
is proposed to eliminate a serious paradox in the present statute, which
permits the occurrence of a circularity of priorities in which a may be
prior to b, b prior to c, and c prior to a.
I. Tnx EXISTING LAW
Interference proceedings grow out of patent applications pending
in the Patent Office at the same time, each of which appears to claim
°Law Clerk of Associate Justice White, United States Supreme Court. Member, Con-
necticut Bar, U.S. Patent Office Bar.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2. The interference as we know it stems from § 16 of the Patent Act of 1836, ch.
357, 5 Stat. 123; § 9 of the prior Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 322, had provided
for arbitration of conflicting claims for grants. Although the analysis which follows
is couched primarily in terms of administrative proceedings to determine priority,
essentially the same considerations are applied in civil actions for infringement when
priority of invention is put into issue. See, e.g., Radio Corp. of America v. Radio
Eng'r Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1934); Reed v. Cutter, 20 Fed. Cas. 435 (No. 11645)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
3. U.S. Pat. Off. R. 201(a), 37 C.F.R. § 1.201(a) (1960).
4. WEBsTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1958) defines "paradox":
"2. A statement self-contradictory or false.
3. Any phenomenon or action with seemingly contradictory qualities or phases."
As used here, the term refers to inconsistent, contradictory, anomalous results which
may follow from the interference laws as they presently stand. Cf. Pirates of Penzance,
Act II ("How quaint the ways of Paradox! At common sense she gaily mocksl");
Othello, Act II, Scene 1, lines 139-40 ("These are old fond paradoxes to make fools
laugh in the alehouse .... ").
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the same subject matter,5 or else out of one or more applications which
appear to claim the subject matter of a patent issued within the past
year.6 Thus, one of the facts relevant to determining priority, the date
each patent application was filed in the Office, is always known to
the Office at the outset.7 The other significant facts, however, are
usually unknown to the Office and to the party not in control of them.
These are the facts which must be determined in the interference pro-
ceeding, on the basis of the evidence brought forward by the contend-
ing parties. The burden of introducing that evidence repeatedly
shifts back and forth, at least conceptually, between the parties at
subsequent stages of the interference proceeding. The burden of
persuasion,8 however, remains on the party with the later filing
date, the "junior" applicant.
The antiphonic quality of the interference proceeding is perhaps
exaggerated in the previous paragraph, since the casting of the burden
of proof back and forth between the parties is more conceptual than
real. At the outset of the interference, the parties are each required
to file a "preliminary statement," setting forth the facts and relevant
dates as to the events determining priority.9 This statement acts as a
bill of particulars and limits the proof of the parties to what they have
alleged there.10 Thus, the issues are narrowed and it may well be pos-
sible to proceed immediately to the critical disputed issue." Moreover,
5. To insure precise joinder of issue, it is customary for the Office to propose to one
party that he adopt the identical language of his rival's claim. See U.S. Pat. Off. R.
203(b), 37 C.F.R. § 1.203(b) (1960). In any event, "claims in the same language"
must be present in the applications for the interference to proceed. U.S. Pat. Off. R.
203(a), 37 C.F.R. § 1.203(a) (1960).
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1958); cf. id. § 102(g). If the applicant permits a year
to go by after the issuance of a rival patent claiming his invention, without putting in
his own claim for the subject matter, he forfeits his rights to a patent. If, however,
he can show that before the one year expired he had claimed substantially the
same subject matter as his rival, even though the language and scope of his claims
had been slightly different from his rival's, then the applicant may precipitate an
interference by adopting the language of the issued patent even after the one-year
period. In re Tanke, 41 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 919, 213 F.2d 551 (1954).
7. In some circumstances, the true filing date is known to the Office, but
the applicant is entitled to prove an earlier "effective filing date" under the provisions
of 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1958) (earlier effective filing date based on foreign application).
8. This burden is the customary civil burden, the preponderance of the evidence.
Evans v. Associated Automatic Sprinkler Co., 241 Fed. 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1917); Dia-
mond v. Woodyard, 38 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 816, 823, 186 F.2d 729, 734 (1951). But
cf. Reusch v. Fischer, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1357, 49 F.2d 818 (1931) (attorney-
client).
9. U.S. Pat. Off. R. 215-17, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.215-17 (1960).
10. U.S. Pat. Off. B. 223-25, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.223-25 (1960).
11. See Elmore v. Schmitt, 47 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 959, 960, 278 F.2d 510, 512
(1960). For example, if the junior applicant alleges a reduction date after and
conception date before the senior applicant's filing date, and the senior applicant
does not allege possession of evidence as to conception or reduction to practice dates,
the only issue to be resolved is whether the junior applicant can establish that he
had been diligently and continuously seeking to reduce the invention to practice from
[VOL. 16
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the parties do not take turns, alternately introducing their evidence on
each stage. Instead, the junior applicant opens with his testimony in
chief, the senior applicant then puts in his testimony, and finally the
junior applicant closes the hearing with his rebuttal testimony. For
purposes of analysis, however, it is highly useful to consider the
interference in terms of the constantly shifting burden to come for-
ward with evidence.
Reduction to practice, conception. If the parties rest their cases
on their respective filing dates, the proceeding terminates forthwith
in favor of the senior applicant (i.e., the one who filed first). 13 The
junior applicant may carry the interference forward, however, if he
alleges that he reduced the invention to practice or else that he con-
ceived it prior to his rival's filing date. 14 Reduction to practice, a
highly technical conception, may be defined in very general terms
as building or successfully using the invention.'5 Conception of the
invention is understood to be something beyond mere appreciation
of the desirability of achieving the result which the invention reaches,
when it is ultimately reduced to practice; the means of accomplishing
the desired result must be determined, and there must be disclosure in
such tangible form as to corroborate the fact of conception.
16
The interference: reduction to practice stage. Should the junior
applicant establish his reduction to practice prior to the senior ap-
plicant's filing date, the burden of introducing further evidence rests
on the senior applicant, and if he fails to do so, he loses the inter-
ference. But if he establishes that his is the earlier reduction to
practice date, he shifts back to his rival the burden of introducing
further evidence, at this point on conception, and he remains the pre-
vailing party at the close of the reduction to practice stage of the
proceedings. On the other hand, if his is the later reduction to practice
a time prior to the senior applicant's filing date. If he can prove this, then ac-
cording to U.S. Pat. Off. R. 257(a), 37 C.F.R. § 1.257(a) (1960), case (7) of note
18 infra will be presumed to obtain, and the junior applicant must prevail; otherwise,
the senior applicant must prevail. See note 23 infra.
12. U.S. Pat. Off. R. 251(a), 37 C.F.R. § 1.251(a) (1960). This rule also pro-
vides that, when a files first, then b files, and then c files, the order of presentation of
evidence will be: C opens, b opens, a puts in entire case, b rebuts, c rebuts.
13. See U.S. Pat. Off. R. 225, 257(a), 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.225, 1.257(a) (1960).
14. See Ewing v. Fowler Car Co., 244 U.S. 1 (1917).
15. See generally Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Doven Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 383
(1928) (performance of process; assembly, adjustment, and use of machine; complete
manufacture of article of manufacture; complete synthesis of composition of matter);
Sherwin v. Drewson, 29 App. D.C. 161, 173 (1907) (production of "something of
practical use, coupled with a knowledge, preferably by actual trial, that the thing will
work"); Guinot v. Hull, 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 982, 204 F.2d 281 (1953). See also
Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scales Corp., 166 Fed. 288, 297 (1st Cir.
1909) (filing constitutes constructive reduction to practice).
16. See Downs v. Andrews, 25 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Armstrong v. DeForest
Radio Co., 280 Fed. 584 (2d Cir. 1922); Field v. Knowles, 37 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1211,
1238, 183 F.2d 593, 611 (1950).
1962]
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date, the senior applicant must proceed to the conception stage and
introduce his evidence on that point or else the interference will termi-
nate in favor of his rival.
The interference: conception stage. As indicated, the burden of
producing evidence on conception rests on the party last to reduce
the invention to practice. If his defeat at the reduction stage is fol-
lowed by another defeat at the conception stage, the interference
terminates in favor of his rival, as it would had he rested his case at
the end of the reduction stage. But if an earlier conception date is
established by the party last to reduce, he can become the prevailing
party in the interference if and only if he follows up with a second
victory: establishing that he exercised reasonable diligence in at-
tempting to reduce the invention to practice throughout the period
from immediately prior to his rival's conception date until his own
date of successful reduction to practice.17 Failing such proof, victory
in the interference reverts to the party first to reduce.18
II. THE Axio_ aac SYsTEm
The law governing priority can be expressed completely in terms
of the relative time sequences of dates of filing, reduction, conception,
and diligence. Once the basic interference rules are enunciated in
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958). This time period is often termed the "critical
period." See, e.g., Elmore v. Schmitt, 47 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 958, 960, 278 F.2d 510,
512 (1960); Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 46 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 969, 972, 268 F.2d 763,
766 (1959). Diligence in filing after reduction is not deemed essential, unless the
non-diligence is so gross as to constitute abandonment or suppression of the invention.
See ibid.; DeForest v. Hartley, 10 F.2d 901, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Diamond v. Wood-
yard, 38 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 816, 821, 186 F.2d 729, 733 (1951); Miller v. Hayman,
18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 848, 46 F.2d 188 (1931). Diligence before conception is, of
course, not meaningful, since "diligence" constitutes perfection of the means con-
ceived and thus presupposes conception of the means to be patented. See In re
Tansel, 45 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 834, 253 F.2d 241 (1958). The policy of the diligence
rule, as will be further developed in the text accompanying notes 42-48 infra, is to
reward the inventor who works diligently toward reduction to practice while his
rival is slothful or attends to his other concerns. The policy rests on the presumption
that this rule results in more rapid technological progress.
18. The discussion in the preceding paragraphs is summarized in a commonly used
graphical form in the following diagrams, where time sequence runs from left to right,
F = filing date, R = reduction date, C = conception date, and D-*R = a continuous
period of diligence ending in successful reduction. The party on the upper line always
prevails. The only facts proved in the interference are those specifically indicated,
except where elipsis (...) is shown for filing dates, in which case that information is
immaterial.
(1) F (2) R F (3) R ...
F FR
(4) C R 1, (5) C CR I.. (6) cCR [R
(7) C D----R . (8) C R
C R C D---R
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terms of these facts, it becomes possible to determine priority between
parties for any fact pattern which may be established by the evidence.
Time sequence notation. The semicolon will be used here to indi-
cate the succession of events. Thus "U;V" indicates that the event U
happened and then the event V happened. This time relationship can
be defined by two axioms:
(Al) IF U;V, THEN U AND V AND NOT V;U. (That is, from "U;V"
it follows that U occurred at some time, that V occurred at some time,
and that "V;U" is a false statement.)
19
(A2) IF U;V AN V;W, T-EN U;W. (That is, if U happened before
V, and V before W, then U happened before W. The further con-
vention for using the semicolon will be adopted that the foregoing
state of affairs-U;V Am V;W-may be indicated by "U;V;W.")20
Primitive terms and formation rules. The primitive terms of the
axiomatic system are the one-place predicates F, R, C (which cor-
respond to the once-occurring events of filing, reduction, and concep-
tion) and D (which corresponds to the generally recurring event of
exercise of due diligence). Each of these when followed by a variabl=- c
(lower case letter-a, b, c.. .- standing for person a, person b, person :
c...) indicates an event, e.g., Ca (a conceives the invention), Db (b
is exercising due diligence in reducing the invention to practice) 4
The axioms defining well-formed expressions containing these terms
follow:
(A3) In any interference involving parties a, b, c ... n, Ca;Ra;Fa,
AN Cb;Rb;Fb, Am Cc;lc;Fc . . . AND Cn;Rn;Fn. (That is,
conception occurs before reduction and reduction occurs before
filing.)
(A4)iF Da, T=EN Ca;Da;Ra. (That is, diligence by the inventor in
reducing the invention to practice occurs only after his con-
ception and before his reduction.)21
19. It should be noted that (Al) does not imply "Iw NOT (U;V), rn V;U." That
"U happens and then V happens" is false may mean merely that U never happened
or that V never happened.
From (Al), it can readily be proved that U;U is never true. Proof: substitute U
for each V in (Al). Certain acute problems, however, are posed by recurring events,
i.e., successive occurrence of events of the same class. Thus "U;U" is meaningful if
understood as "U1;U2"-John shaved himself on May 1, 1961, and then again on May
2, 1961. To be sure, if "John shaved himself on May 1, 1961," rather than "John
shaved himself" is regarded as the event, then the problem disappears. Unfortunately,
however, one of the relevant facts in interference law, viz., diligence, is most feasibly
handled as a recurrent event rather than as a unique event. This requires extreme
circumspection to avoid paradoxes, or else requires a degree of notational rigor which
the writer deems unacceptable in this context.
20. It should be noted that the expression U;V does not imply that there are no
other prior, intervening, or subsequent events, e.g., an X, Y, and Z, such that X;U;Y;
V;Z. By the same token, only the material facts will be set out in the expressions
used here; facts not stated are not necessarily false.
21. See note 17 supra. Due diligence from the time U until successful reduction to
1962]
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(A5) Any expression, and only such an expression, which is other-
wise proper (well-formed in propositional calculus) and which
is not inconsistent with (Al) to (A4) is permitted in this sys-
tem.22
(A6) Rule as to proof: In the absence of proof to the contrary, it
will be presumed that there are no events X or Y such that
Ca;X;Ra;Y;Fa. (That is, unless evidence is brought forward,
the presumption is that conception and reduction immediately
precede filing, in that order, and without significant interven-
ing events.)23
Priority rules. The only remaining primitive term in the system is
the two-place relationship, Pab, which means that a has a prior claim
over b to the patent involved in the case. The rules as to relative
priority between any two parties a and b may be summarized as fol-
lows:
(RI) w for every event X, such that Cb;X;Ra, X = Da, THEN Pab.2
practice is indicated: "for every event X, such that U;X;Ra, X = Da." By X = Da-i.e.,
"Da" may be substituted for "X" in the previous expression (U;X;Ra) and the expres-
sion's truth value will be unchanged-it is meant that a is diligent at the time of X.
Want of due diligence between U and reduction would be indicated: "U; NOT-Da; Ba,"
i.e., after U and before Ra there is a time when NOT-Da.
22. Somewhat more precisely, this might be expressed:
(A5) Any expression of the following form (and only such expression) is proper
(well-formed) in this system:
(1) One of the predicates C, R, F, D, followed by one of the variables a, b, c ...
n, or an X, Y, Z . . . to represent such an expression, or a U, V . . . to represent any
event.
(2) Two or more of the foregoing separated by semicolons.
(3) Two or more expressions of form (1) or (2) appropriately joined with logical
connectives, e.g, AND, on, iF . . . TnEN, for every . . . such that . . . . . . . (that is,
joined in a manner deemed well-formed in propositional calculus).
Any expression inconsistent with (Al), (A2), (A3), or (A4) is false in this system.
23. This is, in essence, the rule of U.S. Pat. Off. R. 2,57(a), 37 C.F.R. § 1.257(a)
(1960). See also Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 34 (1878). With the assistance of (A6)
the paradigms of note 18 supra may be restated as follows:
(1) CR F (2) CR F (3) CR ..
(4)c OR ( (5) C R [.. (6) C R
(7) C D - R .. (8) C R
C R C D-> R
It may be generalized that, except for case (7), iF Ra;Rb, THEN Pab.
24. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. If (R1) is satisfied, then it follows
that Ca;Cb: Since, if we begin by assuming the premise of (R1), (1) Ca must
precede Ra, according to (A3), and (2) Da;Ca is impermissible, under (A4), and (3)
if Cb;Ca;Ra, rather than Ca;Cb;Ra, there will be a moment (time being unquantu-
mized) such that Cb; NoT-Da; Ca, which is contrary to the requirement of (Rl) that
no moment of NoT-Da interpose between Cb and Ra, it must follow that the sequence




(That is, a has a better claim than b, if a has been continuously
diligent throughout the period before his own success in re-
ducing the invention to practice and following b's conception.)
(R2) IF Ra;Rb, and it is not the case that Pba according to (RI),
TEN Pab.2
The second rule may be restated more precisely-
IF Ra;Rb AND NOT (for every event X, such that Ca;X;Rb, X = Db),
THMN Pab.
This expression may be further simplified to the following form:
(R2') iF Ra;Rb AND (Ca; NOT-Db; Rb), THEN Pab.26
The third rule of priority is that Pab implies that a prevails under
(Ri) or (R2). More precisely-
(R3) ir Pab, TEN
(for every event X, such that Cb;X;Ra, X - Da)
OR (Ra;Rb AND [Ca; NoT-Db; Rb]).27
Major theorems. The two major theorems of interference law are
that between two rival applicants (1) no more than one of them
has the prior claim to be designated the inventor, and (2) at least one
of them has the prior claim to be the inventor. These may be restated:
(Ti) NOT (Pab AND Pba).
(T2) Pab oR Pba.
Each of these theorems may be proved in the axiomatic system which
has been developed above, and the proofs are suggested in the mar-
gin.2S Taken together, (T) and (T2) establish that a two-party inter-
25. See note 23 supra.
26. Ca; NOT Db; Rb may be the result of (1) the fact that Ca;Cb (hence NoT-Db
after Ca and before Cb under (A4)) or (2) actual non-diligence by b after Ca, even
though Cb;Ca. From this follows the minor theorem that IF Ca;Cb AND Ra;Rb,
THmm Pab. See Erben v. Yardley, 267 Fed. 345 (D.C. Cir. 1920).
In order to simplify (R2) to (R') it was necessary to adopt a further convention,
(A7) that it will be presumed that for any event X, such that X;Ra, X - NoT-Da,
unless a, the party in control of this evidence, establishes that his behavior meets the
standard of (R). That is, non-diligence will be presumed unless due diligence is
proved by evidence. This is the rule followed by the Patent Office. See Keizer v.
Bradley, 47 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 709, 270 F.2d 396 (1959); Hull v. Davenport, 24
C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1194, 90 F.2d 103 (1937). Thus, (Ca; NoT-Db; Rb) in (R2)
means that b fails to prove his due diligence throughout the period between Ca
and Rb. The conventions (A6) and (A7) could have been avoided by using a
modal logic in phrasing all the rules, see VON Wpacirr, AN EssAY IN MODAL LOGIC
29-35, 42-56 (1951), instead of the conventional logic employed here. Thus, in (Ri)
and (R3), "X = Da" would be replaced by "it is proved that X = Da." But the
added complexity does not appear to be justified in the circumstances.
27. (R1), (112), and (R3), the necessary and sufficient conditions for Pab, can
be combined into one general rule by changing the "if" of (R3) to "if and only ifi"
(logical equivalency).
28. Each theorem can be proved by the method of proof by contradiction. That
is, the contrary of what is to be proved is assumed, and this is then shown to entail
a contradiction. It follows that the initial assumption must be incorrect.
To prove (T1), assume the truth of "Pab AN Pba." Use of (R3) leads to a num-
ber of alternative propositions each one of which is self contradictory. E.g., party a
19621
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ference proceeding will establish which of two rival claimants is the
true inventor entitled to the patent. Of course, if this could not be
shown then there would be no justification for the existence of the
axiomatic system; that these theorems can be proved furnishes the
reason for the existence of interference law.
29
III. Tim THREE-PARTY INTEMFERENCE PARADOX
Thus far the general principles of interference law have been de-
veloped without discerning any paradoxes. The two-party interference
has been shown to be completely determinate in terms of the facts
C, D, R, F.30 The next reasonable question is whether the same holds
true for the three-party interference.
One might well assume, from (A3) which states that temporal suc-
cession goes one way, that-m (Pab AND Pbe), TMN Pac (that is, NOT
[Pab AND Pbc AND Pea]). This hypothesis can be tested by the
method of proof by contradiction: we look for a contradiction to
follow from assuming that-Pab AND Pbc AN Pea. If a self-contradic-
tory proposition follows, then the hypothesis is correct since its denial
is false. By (R3), a conjunction of three sets of propositions follows
from Pab AND Pbc AND Pca: first, (R3) as set out above at page 137;
second, that expression with "Pbc" substituted for "Pab" (and there-
fore b for a, and c for b); and third, that expression with "Pea" sub-
stituted in. This complicated expression can be represented diagra-
matically by showing the and's as series paths and the or's as parallel
paths :31
/for every event for every even for every event
X, suc that Cb; 4 Y such that Cc; .. 1z, such that Ca; -,
XRX it=w Y;Rb,Y =Db JZ; RcZ=Dc
Ea;_ _______ R::cI.] ;o-D; Rc,1Ral-j c N-a;Ral.
Certain paths, such as the lowest series path, via Ra;Rb... Rb;Rc
...Rc;Ra, represent propositions that are obvious contradictions.
is both diligent and non-diligent at the same time. The second theorem may be
proved similarly by assuming the truth of "NOT (Pab OR Pba)," i.e., "NoT-Pab AND NOT
Pba." This entails a complicated string of contradictions.
29. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
30. It should be noted that by (A6) F is relegated to a minor role here, as it is
in actual practice except to the extent that it allocates the initial burden of proof.
This is by no means an unimportant factor, however, in interference practice. There
is a well-known saying, "I would rather be the senior party than the first inventor."
1961-62 MANAGEENT SuRvEY OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 58 (Sen. Pat., T.M., Copr.
Subcomm. Print 1962).
31. See Allen, Toward a Procedure for Detecting and Controlling Syntactic
Ambiguity in Legal Discourse, in 3 ADvANC:.s N DOCUMENTATION AND LmRAnr SCXENC
955 (Kent ed. 1961). The series paths represent AND, while the parallel paths represent
OR.
[VorL. 16
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Other paths, however, may be traversed without contradiction, e.g.,
the lower branches of the first two loops and the upper branch of the
third, which involves (1) Ra;Rb;Rc, (2) Ca; NoT-Db; Rb, (3) Cb;
NOT-Dc; Rc, (4) Dc for at least the interval from Ca to Rc. This may be




Pab because (1) Ra;Rb and (2) b does not rebut this by proving
prior conception plus diligence before Ca.32 Pbc for the same reason;
c's diligence is insufficient to prevail over b. The diligence of c is
sufficient, however, for Pca. 3 The proof by contradiction fails.
There is, then, a three-party interference paradox.3 It is possible
32. The result is the same if b is never diligent. What is critical for the circuity
of priorities is that b not commence due diligence before Ca, and that c commence
diligence between Cb and Ca.
33. It is obvious from the diagram that there is at least one n-party interference
paradox:
C R
C D-- -- )R
C D - 1-
c D - --- 4 R
C D-CD
C D---------------------- ------ R
This is, of course, not the only pattern for a higher-order paradox. The following
arrangement of reduction and conception dates gives rise to a more intricately pat-
terned five-party paradox most readily characterized by a pentacle inscribed in a penta-
gon, where the direction of priorities in the circumscribing pentagon runs counter
to the priority order of the inscribed pentacle:
(a) C R a
(b) C D >R
(c) C D------ -- >
(d) C D- >R e b
(e) C D - R
Priorities follow direction of arrows.
34. The author has found no reported decision indicating that this paradox has been
the subject of litigation. The paradox is recognized, however, in Ferrill, An Anomalous
Situation in the Law of Interference as Applied in Multi-Party Cases, 33 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 457 (1951).
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for a to have a better claim than b, b have a better claim than c, and
c have a better claim than a. Or, to put it more boldly, a may have
invented the object prior to b, b prior to c, and c prior to a. Analysis of
the diagram leads to no further distinct paradoxes.35 The presence of
one such paradox, however, should be sufficient to warrant re-
examination of the statutory priority rules. To be sure, other remedies
short of modification of the priority rules may be adopted to eliminate
the paradox. The patent could be awarded to a, b, and c, as joint pro-
prietors, as is done with joint inventors who have cooperated in de-
veloping an invention.3 6 Or the patent could be granted to none of
them, and cast into the public domain.37 But neither of these solutions
appears desirable. Some one of the parties should be the true "original
and first inventor"3 to whom the exclusive right to the discovery be-
longs, and our interference law should be adequate to determine this.30
35. It should be noted that whether Cb;Cc or Cc;Cb in the diagram, the result
is the same. Ferrill, supra note 34, uses what amounts to Cb;Cc. In the former case,
with whatever significance that may have, c is no longer the "first to conceive" of
a, b, and c. Query: Does this deny c the power to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958)
against a? The author believes that "first" and "last" as used in § 102(g) are in-
tended to mean "earlier" and 'later," preserving the two-party relationship suggested
by the last words of the section, "the other."
36. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1958).
37. Cf. Dutcher v. Matthew, [1905] Dec. Com. Pat. 455, holding with respect
to the allocation of burden to file preliminary statement that "junior party" means
any party not the first, even though not the last. By analogy, the priority rules
could be understood to eliminate those with poorer claims, rather than to choose
the party with the best claim, cf. Christie v. Seybold, 55 Fed. 69, 78 (6th Cir. 1893),
and if all were eliminated by the rules, none would have proved himself fit to warrant
his receiving the grant. This is, it is believed, a fairly drastic approach. See also
Comments, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Socy 695 (1951).
38. See 35U.S.C. § 115 (1958).
39. See text accompanying note 3 supra. See also Radio Corp. of America v. Radio
Engineering Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 3 (1934).
One way to resolve the paradox, and at the same time purport to use the existing
statute as it stands, would be to break the circuity chain arbitrarily by eliminating one
of the parties, and then apply the customary two-party rule between the survivors.
This is the technique frequently used by the courts in lien circuity problems. See, e.g.,
In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1959); In re Quaker City Uniform
Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956); Miller's Appeal, 122 Pa. 95, 15 At. 672 (1888);
Wilcocks v. Waln, 10 S. & R. 380 (Pa. 1824). For example, the second claimant, b,
might well appear to be eliminated under any theory, because he is intermediate in
conception time, reduction time, and time of commencement of diligence; whatever
policy is at stake would not seem to warrant favoring him above all others. And once
b is eliminated, c prevails over a under the standard rule.
This solution has little to recommend it, however, except that it is a solution.
Without determining specifically what the policy of the interference rule is, it is hardly
reasonable to assume that b is necessarily to be disfavored, despite his intermediate
time status as to each of the relevant factors taken singly. The proposed solution
ignores one of the relevant priorities-that of b over c because of prior reduction
not rebutted by due diligence-and thus, is able to reach the result. One could with
equal justice, or at least so it would appear, throw a out because he is last on two
out of three factors (conception and diligence). The interference betveen b and c
would then have to be resolved in favor of b.
Moreover, further ad hoc refinements are necessary in the n-party interference as
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If modification of the priority rules is feasible, that would appear to
be the preferred solution. The proposal which follows, it is believed,
represents such minimal tinkering with the priority rules as will
eliminate the paradox without doing violence to the policy of the
statute.
IV. TnE PROPOSED MODIFICAnON
Many ways to avoid the three-party paradox can be devised. A
pure race of diligence in filing or in reducing to practice could be
substituted.40 Or earliest date of conception could be made de-
terminative. Although they each have the advantage of simplicity,
these alternatives would do violence to the policy of the interference
law, and they are therefore unlikely to command acceptance.
Section 102(g) of the present Patent Act4 ' stems originally from
the Patent Act of 1836.42 While the present provision directs the
Patent Office to consider, in awarding patent grants, the "reasonable
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to prac-
tice, from a time prior to conception by the other," the prototype, sec-
tion 15 of the 1836 statute, made it a defense to an infringement suit
that the patentee had "unjustly obtained the patent for that which was
in fact invented or discovered by another, who was using reasonable
diligence in adapting and perfecting the same."43 The reason for
the enactment of section 15 is uncertain." Mr. Justice Story found
it somewhat puzzling that the race of diligence was not to be
given full sway, but he rationalized the provision in terms of the
general equitable doctrine that he who is first in time is first in right,
in the absence of intervening rights.45 The policy of the diligence
doctrine, as it has now crystallized, is that inventors should be en-
couraged (or coerced) to reduce their conceptions to practice, in
order that the public may secure their benefit and that the progress
of the useful arts be furthered.46 At the same time, it is deemed un-
n exceeds three. Unfortunately, the more complex solutions proposed in lien circuity
cases (see generally Gilmore, Circular Priority Systems, 71 YALL LJ. 53, 58-63 (1961))
do not lend themselves to the present case for want of a fund to distribute. But see
text accompanying note 36 supra.
40. See Reed v. Cutter, 20 Fed. Cas. 435, 438 (No. 11645) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841);
Woodcock v. Parker, 30 Fed. Cas. 491 (No. 17971) (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). The 1961-
62 MANAGEMNT SuRvEY OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 59 (Sen. Pat., T.M., Copr. Subcomm.
Print 1962) suggests that the basis for patent award should be changed to the reduction
date, apparently for reasons of administrative convenience.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958).
42. 5 Stat. 123, § 15.
43. This defense is now subsumed under the more general defense of invalidity.
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1958) (Revisers Note). See also 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1958).
44. The legislative history gives little indication of Congress' intent. See S. Doc. No.
338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Rep. on S. 239, 1836).
45. See Reed v. Cutter, 20 Fed. Cas. 435, 438 (No. 11645) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
46. See Watson v. Allen, 254 F.2d 342, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Derr v. Gleason,
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fair to the diligent, painstaking inventor 47 to allow the fruits of victory
to be snatched from him by the rival who was earlier to conceive, but
who has slumbered on his rights until stirred into activity by a rival's
success. 48
These policies are preserved and the paradox is eliminated by a rule
which relaxes the requirement that diligence precede the rival's con-
ception date to a requirement that diligence merely precede the com-
mencement of the rival's diligence. The rationale of the present rule
of making the rival b's conception date (Cb) the beginning of the
critical period during which a, the claimant earlier to conceive, must
be diligent is that (1) prior to Cb, b has no standing to complain
about a's activities, prejudicing him, and (2) after Cb, b's rights have
begun to accrue and a ought to be diligent if he would retain his
priority. But b's rights may just as well be deemed to accrue only
when his diligence commences.49 Indeed, there is no reason to hold
a to diligence and to allow b to indulge in the languors forbidden his
rival.5 0 The policy of the diligence rule (viz., encouraging inventors
to reduce their conceptions to practice promptly) would appear as
applicable to b as to a.
Accordingly, the following amendment is proposed to section 102
258 Fed. 969, 972 (D.C. Cir. 1919); cf. Hubbard v. Berg, 40 App. D.C. 577, 582 (Ct.
App. 1913); Christie v. Seybold, 55 Fed. 69, 77 (6th Cir. 1893).
47. It should be noted, however, that the diligence (or non-diligence) rule pro-
tects diligent and non-diligent alike against non-diligent rivals. Thus, in the figure
in text preceding note 32 supra, b prevails over c, where both lack diligence and,
indeed, b is even less diligent than c. This corresponds to the facts in Grabowsky
v. Gallaher, 39 App. D.C. 548, 551-53 (Ct. App. 1913); Paul v. Johnson, 23 App.
D.C. 187 (Ct. App. 1904).
48. See UNDERwooD, INTERFERENCE PRACTICE 63 (1920): "There can be no reason
for depriving the later, diligent, industrious inventor of a reward in the form of a
patent, merely to accommodate the doleless, idle inventor who has no excuse for
holding back his invention." See also cases cited in note 46 supra. Another category
.of rival against which the diligence rule protects the inventor first to conceive is the
later-conceiving, perhaps overly brilliant inventor whose flash of genius outpaces
the sheer plod of his reasonably diligent rival. This is, in effect, the policy Justice
Story referred to in Reed v. Cutter, 20 Fed. Cas. 435 (No. 11645) (C.C.D. Mass.
1841), and is exemplified by the relationship of c and a in the diagram.
49. This appears to be the position unsuccessfully urged in Grabowsky v. Gallaher,
.39 App. D.C. 548, 551-53 (Ct. App. 1913); Paul v. Johnson, 23 App. D.C. 187 (Ct.
App. 1904), where the facts were as follows:
(a) C a D-"--R
(b) C D >R
In both cases a prevailed despite the superior diligence of b and his own want of
diligence. Although these decisions reflect a proper reading of the statute, the policy
served by the result is not apparent, since the policy of the diligence rule, see note
48 supra, negatives the possibility that the law would merely award the race to the
swift (in reducing).
50. See Hubbard v. Berg, 40 App. D.C. 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1913). Compare the
liligence of b with that of c in the diagram in text preceding note 32 supra.
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(g) :51 strike "conception" and substitute "the commencement of like
diligence," and then strike "first to conceive and,"52 making the revised
section read: "there shall be considered.., the reasonable diligence
of one who was last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to the
commencement of like diligence by the other."53 Perhaps it would be
as well to add a further particularization of the present diligence rule
at the close of the section: "'Diligence' shall be deemed to be re-
stricted to continuous effort which successfuly terminates in reduction
to practice."54
Restatement of the priority rules. This statutory amendment would
alter (Ri) from the form as given before to:
(RlA) IF there is an event U, such that:
(1) U; NOT-Db; Rb,
AMD
(2) for every event X, such that U;X;Ra, X = Da, THEN
Pab.
51. The present language of § 102(g) is set out here in roman type, the proposed
deletions are surrounded by brackets ([]), and the proposed additions are set out in
italics:
* * * In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only the
respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also
the reasonable diligence of one who was [first to conceive and] last to reduce
to practice, from a time prior to [conception] the commencement of like diligence
by the other. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1958).
52. It was necessary to strike the "first to conceive" qualification to avoid substitution
of a new paradox for the old. Thus, if Ca;Cb is left in as a further requirement
under the rule, see (RIA) in the text following note 54 infra, the following three-
party paradox may occur:
(a) C D-->R
(b) C D >R
(c) C D )R
Here, Pab, despite the greater diligence of b, because b may not invoke the diligence
rule since Ca;Cb. Pbc because Rb;Rc, unrebutted by proof of c's superior diligence.
Finally, Pca under the new diligence rule.
It should be noted that this deletion eliminates the minor theorem referred to in
note 26 supra (first to conceive, first to reduce).
53. For the reasons previously given in text, there would appear no valid basis for
focusing attention on the conception date in itself. Reduction to practice, rather than con-
ception, is "invention" under our law. See Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen
Co., 140 U.S. 481, 489 (1891); Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp. v. Maurice A.
Garbell, Inc., 204 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1953). Attention is paid to conception only
for the purposes of the diligence rule, and the use of the restriction "first to conceive"
in § 102(g) has been warranted only because the old diligence rule requires com-
mencement of diligence before the rival conceives, therefore making the rule un-
available to the party last to conceive. (And even there, the use of the restriction
is redundant.) Adoption of a pure diligence rule, however, makes recourse to con-
ception dates relevant only for delimiting the earliest possible diligence date. Thus
C, as already proved to be the case with respect to F, is relegated to a minor role
in determining priority of invention.
54. Change of 'last" to reduce to "later" would also be more in keeping with
practice than the existing language. And elimination of "conception and" in the phrase
"respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention" would appear
appropriate in view of the relative unimportance of that date. See note 53 supra.
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That is, a prevails under the new diligence rule if there is a point
in time at which his reasonable diligence has begun but b's has not
yet begun. Such diligence, of course, must proceed continuously to
reduction to practice.
This revision of (RI) necessitates corresponding revision of (R2').
Thus (R2") becomes:
(R2A) iF Ra;Rb, Am
there is no event U, such that:
(1) U; NoT-Da; Ra
AND
(2) for every event X, such that U;X;Rb, X = Db, TIM N
Pab.
By the same token, (R3) must be restated-
(R3A) IF Pab,
THEN
(A) there is an event U, such that:
(1) U; NoT-Db; Rb, AND (2) for any event X, such
that U;X;Ra, X = Da,
OR
(B) Ra;Rb AND there is no event V, such that:
(1) V; NoT-Da; Ra, AND (2) for any event Y, such
that V;Y;Rb, Y = Db.
These three expressions, the necessary and sufficient conditions for
Pab, may be combined diagramatically as follows:5"
there i anfor every evcnt
- - - event U, U; NoT-Db; Rb X, such that .....
such that: U;X;Ra, X = Da
thereis nofor every event
- - event V, - V; NoT-D;faI - Y, such that --
such that: L~~J V;Y;Rb, Y = Db
Major theorems. For the modified system to be acceptable-i.e.,
for it to be adequate to determine priority of invention-three theor-
ems must be provable:
(T1A) NOT (Pab ANDPba)
(T2A) Pab oRPba
(T3A) NOT (Pab AND Pbc AND Pa)
55. See note 27 supra. The facing arrows indicate "if and only if," or necessary
and sufficient conditions (logical equivalency). Each - . . . . . . indicates
"if . . . . then . . ." See note 31 supra.
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Each of them is readily provable by the method of proof by contra-
diction used previously.
Moreover, from these theorems a proof by induction can be de-
veloped that there is no n-party paradox in which a circuity of
priorities exists-of the form Pab, Pbc, Pcd... Pmn, Pna. Instead, in
the modified system, it is necessary that any set of rival claimants may
be arrayed in a linear priority order. This is, to be sure, no guarantee
that other interference law paradoxes may not arise.- But this danger
was just as likely under the unmodified system. It would appear,
then, that there would be nothing to lose, and the elimination of
a paradox to gain, by adoption of the proposed amendment.
Whether adoption of this amendment in the near future is likely
is quite a different matter. The area certainly is obscure and the
general interest in its logical symmetry (outside the patent bar) limited.
Short of a rash of embarrassing cases in the courts, it is difficult to
imagine successful pressure for amendment before the next recodifica-
tion of the Patent Act.5 7
56. Even where the life of the law is logic we still have Coedels Theorem to con-
tend with. According to this theorem, in any logical system of the degree of com-
plexity of that used here (where there are logical quantifiers), only inconsistency
can be proved and consistency can only be hoped for. See 2 Hmnwr & BEaNAYs,
GrnunDmrEN DEn MAmATm 306-24 (1934) (consistency proof requires resort to
higher-order system).
57. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1958). The act was last recodified in 1952. See 66 Stat.
792.
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